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I. INTRODUCTION

In August 2006, Stephen Byers, the former United Kingdom (U.K.)
Transport Secretary' and close political ally of former Prime Minister Tony
Blair, issued a controversial proposal for the U.K. government to repeal its
inheritance tax (IHT).2 Labour's former Chancellor, and current Prime
Minister, Gordon Brown, refused to endorse any plan to abolish the IHT, but
public debate continues as an increasing number of persons become subject to
the tax.3
Currently, the IHT imposes a tax of 40% on the value of an estate in excess
of the £285,000 exemption, which is scheduled to increase to £325,000
by 2010. 4 The tax was originally intended to affect only the landed gentry;
however, recent increases in housing costs have exceeded the increase in the
exemption, exposing more citizens to IHT liability. According to recent
studies, approximately 1.5 million houses in the U.K. are valued at or above
£285,000, which is about one in twelve of all owner-occupied homes.5
In 2002, approximately two million estates-a number expected to more than
double by 2009-had a value in excess of the threshold amount.6 In fact, the
number of estates taxed has more than doubled since Labour came into power
in 1997.
Across the Atlantic Ocean, a similar debate over the U.S. estate tax has
been raging for years, culminating with the Economic Growth and Tax

' Stephen Byers is the Labour Member of Parliament (MP) for North Tyneside. United
Kingdom Parliament, Members & Staff, MPs by Alphabetical List, http://www.parliament.uk/
directories/hciolists/alms.cfm (last visited June 4, 2008).
2 Stephen Byers, Labour's Next PM Must Abolish Inheritance Tax, TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Aug. 20, 2006, availableat http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/200
6/08/20/do2009.xml.
' See Graeme Wilson, Brown Team Slaps Down Tax PleaBy BlairAlly,TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Aug. 21, 2006, availableat http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/08/
21/nlabour321 .xml.
4 Inheritance Tax Act, 1984, c. 51, sched. 1, amended by Finance Act, 2006, c. 5, pt. 6,
§ 155 (Eng.). See also HM Revenue & Customs, FinanceBill 2007, IHTNEWSLETTER (U.K.)
Apr. 2007, at 3-4, availableat http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/cto/apr-07.pdf.
- Stephen Glover, Why Won't the Tories Scrap IHT?, THis Is MONEY (U.K.),
Aug. 21, 2006, http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/tax-advice/inheritance-tax/article.html?in-article-

id=411908&in_pageid=78.
6 Patrick Hennessy, Byers Calls on Labour to Scrap Inheritance Tax, TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Aug. 20,2006, availableat http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/08/

20/niht20.xml.
7 Id.
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Reconciliation Act of 2001,' which gradually phases out estate taxes by
reducing tax rates and increasing the unified credit exemption, until the tax is
eliminated in 2010. 9
This Note will compare the estate tax policies of the United States and the
U.K., evaluating arguments in favor of, and against, wealth transfer taxation
at death, and applying those arguments to the U.K. IHT. Part II will discuss
the philosophical debate surrounding the taxation of estates and will analyze
the historical development of both the U.S. estate tax and the U.K. inheritance
tax. Part III will critique the arguments favoring and opposing wealth transfer
taxation at the time of death. Finally, in Part IV, this Note concludes that the
U.K. should not abolish the IT, but should amend the tax to provide an
exemption for the full value of an individual's primary residence and amend
the rate structure to help offset the lost revenue. This proposal proceeds from
a consideration of historical perspectives on wealth-transfer taxation,
contemporary policy arguments in the United States and the U.K., and the
feasibility of reform amid the U.K.'s current political and economic climate.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Death and Taxes: The Philosophy Underlying Estate and Inheritance
Taxation
In 1789, Benjamin Franklin famously noted that "in this world nothing can
be said to be certain, except death and taxes."'" The debate over whether
property transfers at death should be taxed began hundreds of years ago and
continues today."
For centuries, philosophers have struggled with the question of whether
governments should inhibit inherited wealth or "whether the social contract
between [the state and its citizens] requires [the state to protect] a decedent's

' Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26

U.S.C.).
I Alana J. Darnell, Comment, Toward an Integrated Tax Treatment of Gifts and
Inheritances,34 SETON HALL L. REv. 671, 671-72 (2004) (noting that the estate tax is set to
return to its pre-2001 status in 2011).
" Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste Leroy (Nov. 13, 1789), in JOHN
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 310 (16th ed., 1992).
" John L. McCormack, Justice and Truth in Political Discourse, 36 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 519, 525 (2005).
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property rights after death."' 2 In the seventeenth century, English philosopher
John Locke contended that natural law required that parents enjoy the legal
prerogative to devise property to their children.' 3 Locke viewed the ability to
direct the disposition of property at one's death as a fundamental property
right, which the state should not restrict. 4 Conversely, William Blackstone,
the English jurist and professor, asserted that individuals had no fundamental
or natural right to transfer property at death to devisees or heirs and that the
government had legitimate power to regulate transfers of property at death.'"
Like Blackstone, the English Utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham,
promoted the regulation of inheritances in order to prevent one individual or
family from accumulating an over-abundance of wealth.'6 Bentham placed less
importance on the entitlement of the property owner to transfer his or her
property than on the interests of society.' 7
Today, the philosophical debate over whether to tax wealth transfers at
death continues. American philosopher John Rawls advocated the use of
inheritance and gift taxes, not only to raise revenue, but more importantly to
redistribute wealth and prevent the concentration ofpower.'8 He believed such
taxes enhanced political liberty and equality of opportunity.' 9 In other words,
inheritance and gift taxes are a means to allow people of equal abilities and
aptitudes to enjoy similar opportunities for success regardless of their initial
place in the socioeconomic system.2" Similarly, Professor McCormack
believes that redistributing wealth through taxing wealth transfers at death
promotes a "meritocracy"--a system that tends to promote individual merit,
12 James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 828 (2001).
13 McCormack, supra note 11, at 525, n.39 (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 206-07, 210 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994)).
14 Id. at 525, n.40 (citing JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
207 (Peter Laslett

ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1690); Repetti, supranote 12, at 828.
"s McCormack, supra note 11, at 526.
16 Id. at 526.
17 Id.; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THE THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 88, 122 (C.K. Ogden ed., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931) (1802); Repetti, supra
note 12, at 829 (citing JOHN STUARTMI1L, PRINCIPLES OFPOLITICALECONOMY 808 (W.J. Ashley

ed., Longmans, Green & Co. 1923) (1848) (arguing in favor of the heavy taxation of legacies,
stating, "It is not the fortunes which are earned, but those which are unearned, that it is for the
public good to place under limitation")).
S Repetti, supra note 12, at 829.
19 Id.

20 Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE

L.J. 283, 291-94 (1994) (discussing Rawis's theories); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 73, 83-90, 299-303 (1971).
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rewarding the best and most able. 21 Nonmerit-based factors tend to hinder a
society from being a true meritocracy.2 2 Chief among those factors is the
effect of inheritance, which places individuals at different starting points on
the social ladder.23 Professors Stephen J. McNamee and Robert K. Miller, Jr.
assert that, of all the nonmerit factors, the inherited wealth with which an
individual begins his or her life is the single most important factor in
determining the wealth position that the individual will have at the end of his
or her life.24 Moreover, inheritance is preceded by numerous other advantages,
such as a higher standard of living at birth, the receipt of monetary gifts, the
ability to pursue higher levels of education, and better health care. 25 Another
advantage of inheritance is access to social and cultural capital, including the
value of interpersonal relationships with the economically empowered. 6
In a 2001 interview, Warren Buffett argued against a repeal of the U.S.
estate tax, 27 stating that the estate tax "promot[ed] economic growth, by
helping create a society in which success is based on merit rather than
inheritance. 28 Buffett went on to say that the U.S. is closer to a true
meritocracy than any other nation and that without an estate tax, a wealthy
aristocracy would reign and perpetually bequeath their wealth to their
posterity, leaving the allocation of economic resources to the fate of heredity,
rather than to merit.29 Other commentators criticize the estate tax, believing
that it significantly reduces taxpayers' incentive to save and invest because

2 McCormack, supra note 11, at 526. As opposed to a system heavily influenced by
inherited wealth and advantage, a meritocracy enables individuals to excel based on individual
merit. Id.In its truest form, a meritocracy would guarantee that those individuals with the most
ability could use it fully, without being hindered by the circumstance of having financially
disadvantaged ancestors or growing up with a cultural background that was not conducive to the
development of talent. Id.
22 Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, Jr., The MeritocracyMyth, SOCIATION TODAY,
Spring 2004, available at http://www.ncsociology.org/sociationtoday/v21/merit.htm.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25
26

Id.
Id.; see generally STEPHEN J.MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER, JR., THE MERITOcRAcY

MYTH (2004) (providing a more detailed discussion challenging the belief that America is a

meritocracy).
27 David Cay Johnston,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001,
28 Johnston, supra note
29 Johnston, supra note

Dozens of Rich Americans Join in Fightto Retain the Estate Tax,
at A 1;see also McCormack, supra note 11, at 526-27.
27, at Al; McCormack, supra note 11, at 526-27.
27, at Al; McCormack, supra note 11, at 526-27.
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many anticipate that the government will ultimately receive a considerable
portion of the accumulated fruits of their labor.3"
Because understanding a nation's system of wealth transfer taxation is
crucial to understanding the arguments in favor of and in opposition to the tax,
the following sections provide an overview of both the history and current
operation of the U.S. and the U.K. systems of wealth transfer taxation.
B. HistoricalOverview and Current Operationof the U.S. Estate Tax
The modem U.S. estate tax debuted in 1916, but efforts to tax the transfer
of wealth date back almost to the nation's founding. Facing difficult relations
with France, Congress imposed a stamp tax on legacies and intestate shares of
personalty in 1797; however, Congress repealed the stamp duty in 1802."' It
was not until the Civil War dramatically increased the need for the government
to raise additional revenue that Congress began to consider levies on wealth
transfers.32 In 1862, Congress enacted an inheritance tax that was repealed
in 1870"3 because it was difficult to administer. In addition, direct descendants
paid most of the inheritance taxes, a result which Congress believed to be
inequitable, particularly in light of the nation's decreased need for revenue.34
Revenue needs again prompted Congress to impose an estate tax-the National
Inheritance Tax-in 1898, during the Spanish-American War.35 The Supreme

30 Daniel J. Mitchell, Death Tax Should Be Killed, Not Wounded, CAPITALISM MAG.,

Apr. 29, 2005, availableat http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4213.
3"Barbara A. Hauser, Death Duties and Immortality: Why Civilization Needs
Inheritances,34 REALPRoP. PROB. & TR.J.363, 375 (1999).
32 Darnell, supra note 9, at 675.
33The 1870 abolition of the inheritance tax involved little debate in the House of
Representatives even though there was no "widespread objection to these taxes." Id.Despite
repealing the inheritance tax, Congress generally viewed the tax "just and equitable," but
unnecessary when the federal government did not have a heightened need for revenue. Id.
3 Hauser, supranote 31, at 375.
5 Agustin Josd Men~ndez, Taxing Europe: Two Casesfor a EuropeanPower to Tax (With
Some Comparative Observations), 10 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 297, 332 (2004). See also Darnell,
supranote 9, at 677. The National Inheritance Tax of 1898 was a Congressional response to a
desperate need for an influx of revenue during the Spanish-American War. See id. This tax was
not the traditional inheritance tax, but rather it was a "modified estate duty"-tax rates
accelerated as the size of the estate increased instead of increasing with the size of the recipient's
share. Id.
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Court approved the National Inheritance Tax of 1898 in Knowlton v. Moore,a6
but Congress repealed the tax in 1902 following the war's conclusion.3 7
Confronted with yet another war-World War I-Congress enacted the
federal estate tax in 1916,38 which, despite many revisions, largely continues
in effect today.39 Unlike an inheritance tax, which places the responsibility of
paying the tax on each heir or devisee, the estate tax burdens the decedent's
estate by basing the transfer tax on the decedent's accumulated wealth.4" As
Congress debated whether to enact the 1916 estate tax, the American public
also debated the proposed tax.4 Although the progressives called for higher
surtaxes, others attacked the proposed estate tax's progressivity, calling it a
socialistic policy.42 A number of social and political factors merged to enable
Congress to enact the 1916 estate tax.4" The concept of a wealth transfer tax
was familiar to many Americans because of its existence in England and
previous attempts at taxing estates at death in the United States.' Also,
in 1916, public sentiment leaned heavily towards the progressive approach of
imposing higher taxes on the wealthy in an effort to redistribute wealth and to
separate family fortunes.45
Interestingly, the debate, and the 1916 Act itself, ignored the possibility of
taxing inter vivos gifts.4 6 With no tax on gifts, taxpayers avoided the estate tax
by simply transferring all of their property prior to their death.47 Moreover,

178 U.S. 41 (1900).
" Men~ndez, supra note 35, at 332.
38 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, 39 Stat. 756, 777 (1916) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
39 Hauser, supra note 31, at 376.
36

4

Id.

4 Darnell, supranote 9, at 679-80.
42 Id.
43 Id. at
44Id.

679.

45 Id.
46 d.; C.
Lowell Harriss, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18
TAXEs 531, 531-33 (1940) (discussing how there were no debates on the taxation of gifts

because the treatment of gifts was incidental to the treatment of income and estates prior
to 1924).
41 See Jeffrey S. Kinsler, A Comparative Proposal to Reform the United States Gift Tax
Annual Exclusion, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 949, 956 (1997); JOHN R. PRICE, PRICE ON
CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING 94-95 (1992) (describing that context of the passage of the
first federal gift tax in 1924); see also Darnell, supra note 9, at 680-81 (commenting that this
asset transfer prior to death not only avoided estate taxation, but also shifted income generated
by the transferred assets to taxpayers with lower marginal tax rates).
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courts found it difficult to determine which transfers of property were
legitimate gifts and which transfers were made in contemplation of death.48
The Internal Revenue Service and the courts were frustrated by the difficulty
in classifying these transfers, so Congress enacted the Federal gift tax in 1924
as a necessary corollary to the estate tax. 49 However, in 1926, "as part of an
overall tax reduction package," Congress repealed the recently enacted gift tax
and dramatically lowered estate tax rates.5" In place of the gift tax, Congress
enacted an estate tax provision that conclusively presumed that gratuitous
transfers made within two years of death were in contemplation of death and
thus subject to the estate tax.5 1 However, in 1932, the Supreme Court held the
legislatively created conclusive presumption unconstitutional, forcing
Congress to revisit the issue of gift taxation. 2 With the mounting public debt
brought on by the Great Depression, Congress, in 1932, reenacted the
gift tax
53
to raise revenue, balance the budget, and halt estate tax avoidance.
In 1976, Congress overhauled the estate and gift tax system by unifying the
transfer tax system. 54 Under the system still in effect today, a single
progressive rate schedule applies to the cumulative total of lifetime and
testamentary transfers. 55 Under the current unified tax system, the gift tax is
imposed on the donor 6 and assessed on the value of property transferred. 7
The amount of gift tax due is "determined by reference to all gifts made by the
donor during the relevant tax period." 58 The tax is computed using a
progressive rate schedule that considers the "cumulative gifts made by the

48

Kinsler, supra note 47, at 956.

49 Id.
50 Id.
1 Id

52 Id. at 956-57.

The Supreme Court struck down the conclusive presumption that a

gratuitous transfer made within two years of death was made in contemplation of death in Heiner
v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). Interestingly, the Supreme Court had earlier struck down a
similar state estate tax provision just six years earlier, in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230

(1926).
" Damell, supranote 9, at 681; see also Kinsler, supranote 47, at 957.
14 Kinsler, supra note 47, at 957-58.
55 PRICE, supra note 47, at 96; see also Kinsler, supra note 47, at 957-58.
56 The donor is primarily responsible for bearing the burden of the gift tax. I.R.C. § 2502(c)
(2000). However, the donee is secondarily liable for the tax, but only to the extent of the value
of the gifts received. I.R.C. § 6324(b) (2000). See also Kinsler, supra note 47, at 958.
" Unless of course the value of the gift is less than the annual exclusion of $12,000. I.R.C.
§ 2503(b) (2000); see also Rev. Proc. 2007-66, I.R.B. 2007-45, § 2.32(1) (2007).
58 Kinsler, supra note 47, at 958; RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr

TAXATiON 1-17 (6th ed., 1991). See also I.R.C. § 2501 (2005).
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donor during his or her lifetime or, at least, since 1976.""5 Subsequent to the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, "the wealth transfer 6system
0
remained relatively unchanged until the enactment of 2001 Tax Act.",
The 2001 Tax Act arguably created the most significant "changes in the tax
treatment of gifts and inheritances since the adoption of the estate tax
in 1916.,,6' From 2002 through 2009, the 2001 Tax Act gradually reduces
estate and generation-skipping tax liability, both by decreasing the marginal
62
tax rates and "by increasing the amount of the unified credit exemption., For
1%.63
by
annually
reduced
are
rates
tax
the tax years 2002 through 2007,
In 2002, the 50% tax rate was repealed.' In 2002, the 5% "surtax was repealed
and the unified credit exemption was increased to $1 million., 65 In 2004, "the
unified credit exemption for estates increas[ed] to $1.5 million, but the unified
credit exemption for gifts remain[ed] at $1 million., 66 Two years later, "the
unified credit exemption for estates increas[ed] to $2 million," where it
remains until 2009, at which time it increases to $3.5 million. 67 The gift tax
exemption remains at $1 million throughout the duration of the 2001 Tax
Act. 6 ' Finally, the Act "provides for a complete elimination of the estate tax
in 2010. "69 However, the repeal of the estate tax is only for one year-2010.70
Consequently, unless Congress acts affirmatively in the interim, the estate
tax will revert to its pre-2001 levels, and be applied and administered as if
these provisions were never enacted.7" As a result of the November 2006 midterm elections, the Democrats regained a majority of seats in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate.7 2 Currently, it is unclear what, if any,
' Kinsler, supra note 47, at 958; Stephan R. Leimberg, Lifetime Transfers by Gift: An
Overview of FederalGift Taxation, in READINGS INESTATE PLANNING I, at 8.2 (Ted Kurlowicz
ed., 1987).
o Darnell, supra note 9, at 682-83; Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter EGTRA].
61 Darnell, supra note 9, at 671; EGTRA §§ 511, 521.
62

EGTRA §§ 511,521.

63

Darnell, supra note 9, at 694.

6
6'

EGTRA §§ 511, 521. See also Darnell supranote 9, at 694.
Darnell supra note 9, at 694.

66

Id. at 694-95.

Id.; EGTRA §§ 511, 521.
Darnell supra note 9, at 695.
69 Id. at 672.
70 EGTRA § 901. See also Damell, supra note 9, at 672.
"' Darnell, supra note 9, at 695.
72 CNN.com, Elections 2006, Balance of Power, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/

67
68
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action the Democratic controlled Congress will take with respect to this sunset
provision.
C. HistoricalOverview and Current Operation of the U.K Inheritance Tax
In 1986, the British Parliament introduced the IHT, which unlike the capital
transfer tax that preceded it, functions primarily as a direct tax on transfers of
property at death.7 3 The IHT also taxes, retrospectively, certain gifts made
within the seven years prior to the donor's death, although no tax is due when
such gifts are initially made.74 Gifts that are potentially subject to IHT if the
transferor should die within the seven-year period subsequent to when the gift
was made are known as potentially exempt transfers (PETs). 7 5 Despite the
relatively recent revision to the taxation on transfers at death, inheritance taxes
are an established component of British history.
During the Norman Conquest of 1066, "William the Conqueror invaded and
defeated England." 76 William claimed ownership of the conquered land and
distributed it among his nobles.77 He also instituted a feudal system wherein
each member of the system owed various taxes and duties to each superior
landowner." Under the feudal system, the lords and other nobles had
significant power, imposing substantial taxes on lower members of the
hierarchical system.79
One hundred years after the Norman Conquest, in 1166, Henry II imposed
a tax (designed to benefit the Holy Land) by which the King "collected onetenth of the estates of those of who died [prior] to payment."8 By 1215, the
barons, having grown tired of the extortionate taxes imposed by the crown,
forced King John to execute a charter recognizing the barons' liberties-the

pages/results/bop (last visited June 10, 2008).
73 Inheritance Tax Act, 1984, c. 91, amended by Finance Act, 1986, c.41, § 100(1) (Eng.)
("on and after 25 July 1986 the Capital Transfer Tax Act [of] 1984 may be cited as the
Inheritance Tax Act 1984" because the 1986 legislation took the form of an extensive
amendment to the Capital Transfer Tax Act, which was previously consolidated in 1984).
74 Inheritance Tax Act, 1984, c. 51, § 3(A)(5) (Eng.). See also JOHN TILEY, REVENUE
LAW 1228 (2005) (1976).
75

Id.

Hauser, supra note 31, at 373; J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 224 (4th ed. 2002).
77 Hauser, supra note 31, at 373.
78 Id.
71 Id.at 373-74.
'0Id.at 374.
76
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Magna Carta.8 ' The Magna Carta "contained many protections against
unilateral taxation and death taxes," essentially providing for no inheritance
tax. 2
Centuries later, in 1694, the British government again began to tax those
assets in an estate at the time of death. 3 Like the income tax, introduced
approximately 100 years later, the 1694 inheritance tax was a new tax "to help
finance a war against the French. ' 4 In 1894, an estate duty was introduced
in effect until 1965 when it was revamped by the capital transfer
and remained
85
tax.
To understand the current application of the IHT, comprehending the
conceptual starting point of determining what income is subject to taxation is
important. Originally, the U.K.'s income tax system took a synthetic approach
to defining income; however, over time, the country adopted a scheduler
system of income taxation.8 6 A synthetic income tax structure treats all income
the same regardless of its source.8 7 A scheduler system of taxation separates
income into its constituent parts, taking the source of income as its starting
point, and only taxes income originating from specific and defined sources.8 8
Because the scheduler system of taxation adopted by the U.K. began with the
concept of income from things, income was taxed only if it had a source

"I The Rt. Hon. the Lord Woolf of Barnes, James P. White Lecture on Legal Education,
The Judiciary of England and Wales and the Rule of Law (Nov. 8, 2005), revised in 39 IND. L.
REv. 613,614-16 (2006).
82 Hauser, supra note 31, at 374; Woolf, supra note 81, at 615. See also Magna Carta,
chs. 3, 5, in HENRY MARSH, DOCUMENTS OF LIBERTY: FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO UNIVERSAL
SUFFRAGE 41-42 (First American ed., Associated Univ. Presses 1971). For instance, the Magna
Carta "protected heirs who, while under age, were under the King's control." Woolf, supra
note 81, at 615. Previously, "King John had treated the inheritances of these minors as his own";
however, under the Magna Carta, minors received their inheritance "without 'relief or fine."
Id.In 1340, King Edward III reaffirmed that the crown would not impose taxation without the
commons' consent. Hauser, supra note 31, at 374. For a more complete discussion of the
effects of the Magna Carta on English wealth transfer taxation, see generally BAKER, supra
note 76; NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 339 (1993).
83 Byers, supra note 2.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86

William B. Barker, A ComparativeApproach to Income Tax Law in the UnitedKingdom

and the United States, 46 CATH.U. L. REV. 7, 16-18 (1996).
87 Id. at 16.
88 Id.at 16-17.
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enumerated in the taxing act.89 In contrast, the U.S. system of taxation is
synthetic, taxing "income from whatever source derived." 90
Originally, the U.K. system began with the concept of income from things
and, historically, required that these sources be activities engaged in for
profit. 9 In determining the source of the income, "the source must endure
even though income might fluctuate.

92

Therefore, income from real or

personal property was taxable, but the mere ownership of the property itself
was not.93 Prior to 1965, when capital gains became subject to U.K. taxation,
income from the sale or exchange of property was only subject to taxation if
it arose from the conduct of a trade or business. 94
In 1965, the U.K. instituted the capital transfer tax, which was a tax on all
95
lifetime transfers of property (e.g., gifts) other than certain exempt transfers.
From 1965 to 1971, the U.K. imposed a capital gains tax that was deductible
"in computing the value of the estate for estate duty purposes., 96 In addition
to taxing all lifetime transfers, the 1965 capital transfer tax also functioned as
an estate duty, taxing all the property in a person's estate at the time of death.97
The capital transfer tax imposed a tax liability on the deceased's estate as
if, immediately before his or her death, the decedent made a transfer of all
assets in his or her estate at the fair market value of each respective asset, as
determined immediately before death. 98 Capital transfer tax was charged
whenever an individual made a chargeable transfer-any transfer of value
99
made by an individual after March 26, 1974, other than exempt transfers.
The rates of capital transfer tax and the method of computation was determined

89 Id. at 18.

90I.R.C. § 61 (2000). See also Barker, supranote 86, at 16 (contrasting the starting points
used in the U.K. and U.S. taxation systems). Neither the United States nor the U.K. tax the
receipt of gifts as income to the recipient. Id. at 16 & 16 n.61. The U.S. Congress anticipated
in 1913 that gifts would be more appropriately taxed through a separate estate and gift transfer
tax, whereas in the U.K. gifts are not taxed to the recipient because they do not have a source.
Id. at 16 n.61.
91 Barker, supra note 86, at 19.
92 Id. For example, rental income from the lease of an office building may increase or
decrease based on occupancy or the market value of the rents paid, but the building itself
continues to exist even if it remains unoccupied.
93 Id.
94 Id.
91BARRY PINSON, PINSON ON REVENUE LAW 293, 373 (12th ed. 1978).
96

JOHN TiLEY, REVENUE LAw 560 (1st ed. 1976).

9'PINSON, supra note 95, at 378.
98 Id.

99Id.at 373; Finance (No. 2) Act, 1975, c. 45, § 20(1), (5) (Eng.).
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by reference to both when the transfer was made and to the cumulative total of
all chargeable transfers.' 00 Transfers made within three years of the
transferor's death were taxed at lower rates than were transfers made through
the decedent's will or laws of intestacy.10 '
The Finance Act of 1986 replaced the 1965 capital transfer tax, which
imposed a tax on both lifetime gifts and on the value of a person's estate at
death, with the IHT.' 0 2 The major change brought about by the IHT was the
abolition of the tax on lifetime gifts between individuals. 0 3 Now, under the
IHT, gifts made within seven years of death are generally subject to taxation
at a tapered rate, whereas gifts made within three years of death, like
dispositions at death, are taxed at the full rate." 4 IHT is not imposed on gifts
made effective through trusts or companies.'0 5 Furthermore, any gift over
reserves any benefit or control remains a part of the
which the transferor
06
transferor's estate.1
HT is charged whenever there is a chargeable transfer of value, which is
simply a disposition, other than an exempt transfer, causing a reduction in the
total value of the transferor's estate.'0 7 Upon death, there is a deemed transfer
of all property the decedent owned or was beneficially entitled to immediately
The deemed transfer is added to all lifetime
prior to his or her death.'
transfers made during the seven years before the date of death, regardless of
or, became so, because "of
whether such transfers were taxable when made,
10 9
status."'
exempt
potentially
their
of
the loss

100

PINSON, supra note 95, at 379.

101Id. at 378-79.
102 BARRY PINSON, PNSON ON REVENUE LAW 409 (17th ed. 1986).
103Clifford-Turner, United Kingdom, 21 INT'L LAW. 254, 254 (1987).
104Id.; see also PINSON, supranote 102, at 409 (noting that the IHT was built on the structure

of the capital transfer tax, assumed its framework, superimposing an exemption for gifts made
more than seven years before the transferor's death and including a complex set of antiavoidance rules, which are quite similar to the estate duty legislation in effect prior to 1975).
105 PINSON, supra note 102, at 409-10.
106Clifford-Turner, supra note 103, at 254.
107 Inheritance Tax Act, 1984, c. 51, § 3 (Eng.). In addition, IHT is also charged on transfers
at death; on transfers of settled property (whether the transferor has an interest in possession of
the property determines which rules apply); to transfers of value made by close companies; and
there is a special charge for life insurance policies. See generally JOHN TILEY, REVENUE LAW
ch. 66 (5th ed. 2005) (offering a more detailed explanation of the ways in which the IHT
applies).
o8TILEY, supranote 107, at 1224.
109 Id.
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Immediately chargeable transfers are added to the transferor's cumulative
total of transfers when the transfer is made." 0 Tax becomes due when the total
chargeable transfers exceed the exemption amount."' By contrast, PETs do
not give rise to tax at the time of transfer." 2 PETs are taxable if the taxpayer
dies within seven years of making the gift, but have the potential to become
exempt from IHT if the donor lives beyond seven years from the date of the
gift." 3 PETs do not enter the transferor's cumulative total of transfers unless
the donor dies within seven years of the date of the transfer." 4 If the transferor
dies within seven years of the date of transfer, PETs become chargeable as
lifetime transfers and are taxed at death rates; however, the donor receives a
deduction if he or she dies "more than three years after the gift."' " 5
The IHT imposed at death differs from the IHT imposed on lifetime
transfers in four ways. First, "[t]he tax rate on death is [either] 0% or 40%,"
whereas the tax rate on "immediately taxable lifetime transfers is [either] 0%
or 20%."'6 Secondly, "[s]ome of the exclusions are [limited] to lifetime
transfers [while] others [are limited only] to transfers at death."' 7 Thirdly,
immediately taxable lifetime transfers have a grossed-up"' basis, whereas
PETs and transfers at death typically are not grossed-up." 9 Finally, events
but postafter death may affect the amount of IHT charged on the death,
0
mortem events do not affect the taxation of lifetime transfers.12
In determining the amount of HT, there are two rates of progression: a zero
rate for amounts under the IHT exemption amount; and a single rate of 40%,

110 Id.

I Id.

112 Id. (noting

that most forms of outright gifts made during a person's lifetime are PETs).

113 Id.
114

Id.

...Id. Usually it is "advantageous to create a PET rather than an immediately chargeable
transfer," because the delayed taxation allows the donor to enjoy the time value of money; the
donor remains liable for the tax if he or she dies within seven years of the date of transfer. Id.
Similarly, the donor remains liable for "any additional tax due if the transfer is immediately
chargeable and the donor dies within seven years." Id. Such additional tax liability would be
determined by reference to the full rate at death. Id. The burden of such liability is usually
funded by a seven-year-term assurance policy taken out by the donor at the time the gift is made.
See also id.at 1228-29 (providing further information on PETs).
16 Id.at 1224; Inheritance Tax Act, 1984, c. 51, § 7(1), sched. 1 (Eng.).
117 TILEY, supra note 107, at 1225.
118Id.at 1226 (defining grossed-up as increasing the value of the gift by the sum of taxes paid
on it).

119Id.at 1225.
120 Id.
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"which is also the top rate of the [U.K.] income and [capital gains taxes].''
The IHT exemption amount for chargeable transfers made between
April 6, 2005 and April 5, 2006 is £275,000; for chargeable transfers made
between April 6, 2006 and April 5, 2007, £285,000; and for chargeable
transfers made between April 6, 2007 and April 5, 2008, £300,000.122 The
threshold exemption for chargeable transfers made between April 6, 2008 and
April 5, 2009 is £312,000; and for chargeable transfers made between
April 6, 2009 and April 5, 2010, £325,000.123
D. The PoliticalClimate in the U.K
Byers's controversial August 2006 proposal that the U.K. government
repeal the IHT is likely supported by a large percentage of U.K. taxpayers,
many of whom believe the tax is unfair. 2 4 In place of the IHT, Byers has
suggested an increase in the level of environmental taxes to offset the revenue
The income generated by
that would be lost by abolishing the IHT. 2'
environmental taxes has decreased from 3.6% to 2.9% of the U.K.'s gross
domestic product since 1999.126 Despite the recent drop, Byers believes that
an increase in the level of environmental taxation could not only offset the lost
revenue from the abolition of the IHT, but also cause people to change their
behavior and become more environmentally responsible.'2 7
Byers's recommendation of increased environmental taxes met harsh
responses. 2' 8 Treasury officials said, "Do you think there are easy green taxes
sitting about that we haven't considered?"' 29 In order to sufficiently offset the
lost revenue, the Treasury would likely have to increase petrol taxes by 18p a

121Id. at 1226. A rate of 20% is applied to transfers taxed during the decedent's lifetime.
122Inheritance Tax Act, 1984, c. 51, sched. 1, amended by Finance Act, 2005, c.7, § 98

(Eng.). See also HM Revenue & Customs, supra note 4, at 3-4.
123 Finance Act, § 155. See also HM Revenue & Customs, supra note 4, at 3-4.
124 Byers, supra note 2; InheritanceTax is the Second Most Hated in Britain,TMCNET.COM,
Aug. 28, 2006, http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2006/08/28/1834545.htm (noting that 78% of
those surveyed wanted the IHT to either be abolished or significantly increase the exemption).
125 Byers, supra note 2.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Polly Toynbee, Editorial, The Byers Plan Deliberately Ignores Obscene Inequality,
GuARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 22,2006, availableathttp://www.quardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/
aug/22/comment.politics (pointing out weaknesses in Byers's proposal).
129 Id.
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liter or quadruple the price of airline tickets. 3 0 Although environmentalists
may consider these suggestions desirable, the least wealthy travelers (e.g.,
3'
"those who use budget airlines") would be hit the hardest by such changes.'
The biggest problem with Byers's suggested alternative to the lHT is simply
that if increased environmental taxes would truly prompt taxpayers to adopt
environmentally-responsible behavior, then revenues from the given tax would
decrease, 32and the government would still have to find other sources of
revenue.1
Therefore, despite popular disdain for the IHT, Prime Minister Brown is
unlikely to support its repeal and accept the loss of the estimated £3.6 billion
in revenue that the tax is expected to generate in 2006 alone."3 The current
view is that because the rates and threshold exemptions are already set on
chargeable transfers made through 2010, and because of the significant
revenue the [HT generates, it will remain unaltered for many years to come. 34
III. ANALYSIS

A. Arguments Favoringthe Continuationof an Estate or Inheritance Tax
Proponents of estate and other wealth transfer taxation typically argue that
such taxes do not "prevent a person from [working,] earning, saving, or
consuming lavishly"; rather the tax "merely prevents a person's [child] from
automatically" profiting from the fruits of his or her predecessor's labor."'
Proponents also claim that the taxes ultimately serve to promote equality of
opportunity by reducing the drastic effects of wealth disparity.' 36 Opponents
argue that the estate tax is in direct conflict with the American dream of
ascending to wealth from humble beginnings and passing that health along to
one's children. ' "Polling from the late 1990s onward has consistently shown
130 Id.

131Id.
132 Id.

" Alison Steed, Editorial, Brown'sDeath Tax is PosthumousMugging, TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Aug. 21, 2006, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/global/main.jhtml?view=DETAILS&
grid=P8YourView&xml=/global/2006/08/2 1/do2103.xml.
34 Press Release, Kingston Smith LLP, Death Tax Should Be Revised Not Abolished
(Aug. 25, 2006) (on file with author).
135 Mark Bernstein, Note, Should Governments Play Robin Hood? The Effects of the Repeal
of the Estate Tax on Wealth Apportionment, 12 CARDOZO J.INT'L & COMP. L. 187, 194 (2004).
136 Id.
137 Id.
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that 60% to 70% of Americans support [a] repeal" of the estate tax, 3 ' and a
recent poll in England shows that the IHT is the second most hated tax in the
U.K.' 39 Despite popular support for the abolition of estate taxes, estate and
inheritance taxes have endured for centuries because they generate needed
revenue, advance the social policy of redistributing wealth, and encourage
charitable giving. 40
Historically, the most important justification for estate and inheritance
taxation has been the necessity of generating revenue.' 4 ' Revenues generated
by the U.S. estate and gift tax are typically between $20 and $30 billion per
year, which is approximately 1% to 2% of the U.S. government's total
revenue. 4 1 Since the Labour party came to power in the U.K., the revenue
generated by the IHT has nearly doubled, from £1.7 billion in 1997 to £3.3
billion in 2005.143 These revenues, small in percentage terms, help fund
important government programs.'"
Estate and inheritance taxes are progressive, thereby serving to redistribute
wealth. The U.S. estate tax falls primarily on the wealthiest one to two percent
of the public-a surprisingly low percentage given that the estate tax provides
approximately one-third of the tax system's progressivity."' In contrast, the
IHT burdens 6% of the U.K. population and is markedly less progressive.' 46
"The number of estates paying IHT [increased] by more than 70[%] in the five
years" leading up to 2003-2004. 47 Furthermore, "estates valued at under
£500,000 accounted for 71 [%] of all those paying IT at the end of that

138 McCormack, supra note 11, at 527.
139 Inheritance Tax is the
140 Damell, supra note 9,
141 Id. at 683-84.

Second Most Hated in Britain, supra note 124.
at 683-88.

See also Repetti, supra note 12, at 852 (noting that the revenue generated by
the U.S. estate and gift tax in 1999 was $27.8 billion, which was greater than the total tax
liability of taxpayers with adjusted gross income under $15,000 in 1998).
'43 Steed, supra note 133 (noting that U.K. homeowners paid £1.7 billion in IHT through the
end of June 2006, an increase of 13% over the same period in 2005).
144 See Hauser, supra note 31, at 376-77 (noting that the total revenue raised by the U.S.
estate tax does not "reflect the extensive costs of attorneys, accountants, and treasury personnel
involved in explaining and administering the tax"); see also United Kingdom Parliament,
Publications & Records, House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 25 June 2007, http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070625/text70625wOO88.htm (last
visited May 9,2000) (stating that "revenue raised from IHT.. .funds essential public services").
145 Darnell, supra note 9, at 685.
'4 Hennessy, supra note 6.
147Steed, supra note 133.
142Id. at 681.
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period, a rise of three quarters.' 48 "Meanwhile, estates worth more than £2
million contributed less than [one-fifth] of the IHT [revenue]
total," a fall
4
1
2003-2004.1
to
up
leading
years
five
the
of 25% from
The greater progressivity of the U.S. estate tax promotes a more aggressive
redistribution of wealth and fosters what proponents style "equal
opportunity."' 5 ° Estate and inheritance tax proponents believe "that large
concentrations of wealth endanger [the] democratic [character of American]
society" and the equal opportunity of its citizens.' 5 ' In 1843, the noted
American statesman, Daniel Webster, praised the United States's new and
inimitable opportunities: "She holds out an example, a thousand times more
enchanting than ever was presented before, to those nine-tenths of the human
race who are born without hereditary fortune or hereditary rank."' 52 Equal
opportunity, which many believe is stunted by the free flow of inherited wealth
from one generation to the next, has long been prized by Americans."'
However, in the words of Professor Mark L. Ascher, "[W]hat we as a nation
actually proclaim is, 'All men are created equal, except the children of the
wealthy.' "114 "A large percentage of wealth in the United States is dynastic,"
as evidenced by"[s]tudies indicat[ing] that approximately [5 0%] of [individual
wealth] ... is inherited."' 55 Proponents regard estate and inheritance taxes as
an appropriate response to inherited wealth, which is necessary to combat the
inherent inequalities associated with inherited wealth.'5 6
Finally, estate taxation encourages charitable giving.'57 Both the U.S. estate
tax' 58 and the U.K. IHT 59 exclude bequests to charities from the decedent's

148

Id.

149

Id.

Darnell, supranote 9, at 686.
Id.
152 Hauser, supranote 31, at 380 (quoting Senator Daniel Webster, An Address Delivered at
I5'
151

the Completion of the Bunker Hill Monument (June 17, 1843)).
113 Id. at 381.
114 Mark L. Ascher, CurtailingInherited Wealth, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 69, 71 (1990), quoted in
Hauser, supra note 31, at 381.
...Repetti, supra note 12, at 849. "In 1984, 241 of the wealthiest 400 individuals in the
United States" had inherited "a significant ... fortune." Fifteen years later, only "149 of the
wealthiest 400 individuals in the United States" had inherited "a significant ... fortune." Id.
156 Darnell, supra note 9, at 686.
117 Id. at 687-88.
s5 I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2) (2000) provides that a charitable deduction is allowed for the value
of property transferred to or for the use of certain charitable, religious, scientific, literary,
educational, and public organizations. Although the deduction is not subject to any percentage
limitations (unlike the income tax charitable deduction), property for which the deduction is
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estate, thereby allowing the amounts of such donations to escape taxation.
Consequently, "many charitable organizations lobbied against the repeal of the
[U.S. estate tax]," fearing a reduction in charitable bequests. 6 ' According to
one report, charitable bequests in the United
States would likely fall by
61
approximately 79% without an estate tax.
B. Arguments Favoringthe Repeal of an Estate or Inheritance Tax
Opponents of estate and inheritance taxation, members of a movement that
has gained significant momentum in recent years, attempt to refute the various
justifications for estate and inheritance tax and propound further arguments for
abolishing the tax. Opponents claim that estate and inheritance taxes are a
form of double taxation that adversely affects taxpayers' work ethic by
creating a disincentive to save and invest.'6 2 They claim also that repealing the
tax would simplify the tax system, and make it significantly more fair.'63
In response to the claim that the estate tax generates needed revenue,
164
opponents cite the relatively small amount of net revenue the tax generates.
Upon netting the actual revenue generated by the estate tax (U.S.) or
inheritance tax (U.K.) with the costs of its administration (including the costs
of employing the IRS and Inland Revenue agents, as well as the cost of
employing tax lawyers and accountants to combat tax avoidance), the net gain
is minimal. 165 Opponents further claim that tax avoidance schemes essentially
render the tax "voluntary. "166

taken must be included in the decedent's gross estate. I.R.C. § 2033 (2000).
' Inheritance Tax Act, 1984, c. 51, pt. 2, § 23, amended by Finance Act, 1986, c. 41, pt. 5,
§ 102(5)(d) (Eng.).
160 Darnell, supranote 9, at 688; but see Repetti, supra note 12, at 854 (arguing for the repeal
of the U.S. estate tax because it results in a revenue loss by "encourag[ing] contributions to taxexempt charitable entities").
"61B. Douglas Bernheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenues?, I TAX POL'Y & THE
ECON. 113, 131 (1987); see also Repetti, supranote 12, at 854.
162 Darnell, supra note 9, at 689-91.
163 Id. at
'6
165

691.
Id. at 688-89.

Id.; see also McCaffery, supranote 20, at 302. Although unable to determine the actual
costs of administering the U.S. estate and gift tax, Professor McCaffery believes the costs to be
substantial, given that "[q]uestions of valuation and ownership structure are persistent and
complex," and often taxpayers "choose to litigate because of the large stakes."
166 McCaffery, supra note 20, at 302; see also Steed, supra note 133 (reporting that former
Labour chancellor Roy Jenkins once described the IHT as a" 'voluntary levy paid by those who
distrust their heirs more than they dislike the Inland Revenue' ").
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Opponents also object that wealth transfer taxation at death results in
double taxation, as "accumulations of wealth are first taxed under the income
tax system and then again at death."'' 6 However, it is commonplace for "a
significant portion of a taxpayer's wealth at death [to consist] of untaxed,
unrealized appreciation in assets."'' 68 Therefore, proponents argue that if the
U.S. estate tax is repealed, the unrealized gain on the appreciation of the assets
would never be subject to taxation (and certainly not double taxation) because,
under the U.S. tax system, the basis of assets transferred at death receive a
stepped-up basis equal to their respective fair market value, thus allowing
appreciation of the asset that
beneficiaries to avoid taxation on the unrealized
69
occurred while the decedent owned it.'
Scholars have long debated the effects of an estate or inheritance tax on
taxpayer behavior, especially, the effects on work ethic, investment, and
savings. 170 While empirical studies on the effects that an estate or inheritance
tax has on the work ethic of taxpayers conflict (largely because of the extreme
difficulty in isolating the tax as the lone factor), opponents believe that such
a tax significantly decreases a taxpayer's motivation to work.' 7 ' Recent studies
have concluded that heirs of large inheritances and other beneficiaries often
However, in 1997, Chason and
work less after receiving the inheritance.'
Danforth argued that an estate tax is justified because individuals who receive
substantial inheritances are more likely to withdraw from productive
endeavors.' 73

167Darnell, supra note 9, at 689.
161 Id. Double taxation exists in other areas of both the U.S. and U.K. tax systems-notably,
in the United States, sales taxes, which tax consumption of income that is also subject to the
income tax, and, in the U.K., the value-added tax, which similarly taxes consumption. Id. at 690.
169 Id. at 690.
17oId. at 690-91.
171 Id.
171 See Douglas Holtz-Eakin et al., The CarnegieConjecture:Some EmpiricalEvidence,108
Q.J. ECON. 413 (1993) (examining data on tax-return data on the "labor force behavior of people
before and after they receive inheritances" and concluding that "large inheritances decrease a
person's labor force participation"); see also Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Death Tax: Investments,
Employment, and Entrepreneurs,84 TAX NOTES 782 (1999) (noting that the U.S. estate and gift
tax may discourage older taxpayers from working); cf Hauser, supranote 31, at 377 (noting that
one of the most recent justifications for the estate or inheritance tax is that it motivates a person
to work despite the receipt of inherited wealth, because the amount of the inheritance is so
significantly reduced).
173 See Eric D. Chason & Robert T. Danforth, The Proper Role of the Estate and Gift
Taxation of Closely Held Businesses, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 103 (1997) (discussing an
empirical study that compared U.S. estate tax returns of decedents who died in 1982 with the
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Critics also contend that estate taxation discourages savings.' 74 Concern
about the continued incentive to work of beneficiaries of large estates is
compounded by the potential impact on consumption and savings. Not only
are wealthy individuals perhaps likely to choose leisure over work, but they are
also more likely to consume rather than save.' 75 Moreover, younger
generations, who receive inter-vivos gifts early in life, rather than upon the
death of the taxpayer, see little incentive to work and save.' 76
Opponents of the estate or inheritance tax argue that its repeal would not
only simplify the tax code, but also make it more fair.'77 Eliminating the tax
78
would save administrative costs associated with complying with the tax.
Repealing the estate tax would also simplify the valuation of assets."'
Valuation of many assets in a decedent's estate is not difficult; 8 ° however,
valuing the assets of small or closely held businesses often presents significant
problems.'' The basic maxim that the fair market value of a business is the
amount a willing purchaser would pay a willing seller, assuming both parties
have complete knowledge of all relevant facts and neither is under any
compulsion to buy or sell, does not remain entirely valid in the context of
closely held businesses.8 2 For instance, in a family business, restrictions or
conditions on ownership interests could "lower the value of the business to a

income tax returns of the beneficiaries for the tax years 1983 and 1985, which found that of those
beneficiaries who received an inheritance in excess of$150,000, 18% left the labor force within
three years of receiving the inheritance); see also Hauser, supra note 31, at 378 (discussing
Chason and Danforth's argument).
" B. Douglas Bernheim, Taxation andSaving5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7061, Mar. 1999). In truth, it may be difficult to determine the true impact that an
estate tax has on taxpayers' savings. There are two economic theories responding to this
question-each produces a different result. Under the first theory, taxpayers increase savings
to offset the effect of the estate tax. Under the second theory, taxpayers reduce savings and
increase current consumption in the face of an estate tax.
' McCaffery, supra note 20, at 320.
176 Id.
'"
Darnell, supra note 9, at 691.
178 Id. at 691-92.
'79 Randall J. Gingiss, The Gift of Opportunity,41 DEPAuL L. REv. 395, 417 (1992) (noting
that there are "valuation problems inherent in the current [tax] system").
"o Cash has a fair market value equal to its face value. The current trading price of a public
stock or bond is readily available in the business section of a newspaper or online. See generally
The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.con/public.us. Similarly, many publications provide
the value of virtually any automobile. See generally Kelley Blue Book, http://www.kbb.com.
Darnell, supra note 9, at 704 n.266.
182 Gingiss, supra note 179, at 417.
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disinterested purchaser."' 83 Determining the value of an ownership interest in
a closely held business, where often the most valued asset is the decedent's
goodwill, can be extremely difficult, particularly when there is no readily
available market for the ownership interest. Without an estate tax, such
valuations would be unnecessary.
The debate over the fairness of an estate or inheritance tax often centers on
a discussion of vertical equity and horizontal equity.'84 "The principle of
vertical equity states that [taxpayers who have] a greater ability to pay taxes
'
should pay a higher percentage of their income [or wealth] in taxes. 185
Therefore, those taxpayers "who transfer a greater amount of wealth should
pay a higher proportion of their wealth in taxes."' 86 "Vertical inequity occurs
'
when tax benefits are available to some taxpayers[,] but not to others."187
Conversely, "horizontal equity requires that similarly situated taxpayers.., be
taxed alike."'8 8 Therefore, horizontal equity dictates that two taxpayers who
have the same amount of wealth and who make the same transfers at the same
time should be taxed similarly, rather than one taxpayer being subject to less
taxation because of the manner in which his resources were spent.'89 To the
extent that the wealthy are able to defer or even eliminate estate or inheritance
taxes (i.e., through planning mechanisms), vertical equity is violated,
according to opponents.' 9 0

'8 See id. at 417-18 (providing a more detailed discussion of the problems of minority
discounts, shareholder blockage, and lack of marketability).
" See, e.g., Darnell, supra note 9, at 691-92 (discussing the vertical and horizontal equity
issues arising from the U.S. estate tax).

85 Id. at 691 n.151.
186 Id.; see also Kinsler, supra note 47, at 1011-12.

"' Kinsler, supra note 47, at 1011-12 (noting that the annual exclusion for gifts is an
example of vertical inequity, because only the very wealthy are in a position to exploit the
exclusion, whereas moderately wealthy taxpayers, many of whose estates are subject to an estate
tax, "cannot afford to dispose of [substantial] assets during" their lives).
"'8See Darnell, supranote 9, at 691 n. 150 (quoting Christopher E. Erblich, To Bury Federal
Transfer Taxes Without FurtherAdieu, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1931, 1943 (1994)); see also
William G. Gale & Joel B. Slemrod, Rethinking the Estate and Gift Tax, BROOKINGS, Mar. 2001,
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2001/03taxesgale.aspx.
89 Gale & Slemrod, supra note 188. For example, an estate receives a deduction for
charitable bequests under I.R.C. § 2055. However, the Internal Revenue Code provides no
similar deduction for bequests to family or friends. Therefore, horizontal equity is violated
because two taxpayers, with identical wealth, could be taxed differently even though each made
a comparable transfer of property from their estate because the Internal Revenue Code provides
for different treatment of the respective selected recipients.
190 Darnell, supra note 9, at 691-92.
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In addition to the vertical and horizontal inequity of an estate or inheritance
tax, opponents also claim that the tax is unfair because of liquidity 9 '
concerns. 9 2 Their argument is that "many estates are forced to sell assets in
order to pay the tax."' 93 They also argue that the estate tax forces farmers off
their land and forces the sale of many small businesses.' 94
C. ProposedAmendments to the IHT
While it is unlikely the IHT will be abolished, many U.K. taxpayers would
prefer to see some modification of the law. For instance, Andrew Shaw,
personal tax partner at Kingston Smith LLP, suggests that Prime Minister
Brown increase the starting threshold from the current £285,000 to £500,000
in order to bring the exemption amount more in line with the increase in U.K.
housing prices.' 95 From 1999 to 2006, the average cost of a house in the U.K.
jumped from £81,595 to £179,840-a substantial increase of 120%. 96 In
contrast, the IHT threshold exemption amount for 1999 was £231,000, rising
only to £285,000 in 2006-an increase of just 23%. 197 Specifically,
during 2006, the IHT exemption increased from £275,000 to £285,000, a 3%
increase, whereas property prices rose by 6%. 1 Though the IHT originally
intended to target the very wealthy, the dramatic increase in housing prices

'9'"Liquidity" is the "quality or state of being readily convertible to cash." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 950 (8th ed. 2004).
192 Darnell,

supranote 9, at 692.
Id. A drastic reaction to the prospect of having to sell one's assets to pay the estate tax
was when American-born, British filmmaker, and member of the comedy group Monty Python,
Terry Gilliam, renounced his U.S. citizenship in order to avoid the estate tax. Interview by Tasha
Robinson with Terry Gilliam (Oct. 11,2006), availableat http://www.avclub.com/content/node/
54008/2. Although a significant portion of Gilliam's assets are outside the physical boundaries
of the United States, those assets would still be included in his estate and subject to the U.S.
estate tax. Id. In October of 2006, Gilliam said, "[M]y wife would probably have to sell our
house to pay the taxes. I didn't think that was fair on my wife and children." Id.
194 But see McCormack, supra note 11, at 528-30 (contradicting the claim that the estate tax
unduly burdens many farmers and small business owners, Professor McCormack notes that
"[flrom 1989 to 1996, only an average of [6.4%] of taxable estates included farm assets," which
represented only 0.08% of all taxable estates during that period).
'9'Press Release, supra note 134.
196Id.
197 Id.
'98 Sean Poulter, 40% of Families Pay Death Tax, THIS IS MONEY (U.K.), Nov. 27, 2006,
http://www.thisismoney.co.ukltax-advice/inheritance-tax/article.html?in-article-id=41 5063&in_
page id=78.
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past several years has exposed many middle-class taxpayers to the
over the
9
9

tax. 1

Approximately 5.3 million U.K. households now have property valued in
excess of the £285,000 exemption threshold. 00 In addition, another five
million households exceed "the [current exemption] threshold through a
combination of property, other assets[,] and savings."' ' From 1997, when
Labour took control of Parliament, to 2008, the number of taxpayers
in England subject to the IHT is expected to have tripled from
approximately 18,000 in 1997 to a number likely topping 50,000 by 2008.202
Moreover, the latest estimates indicated that 41% of U.K. residents would be
obligated to pay IHT if they died today. 3
The exemption threshold increases annually, but recent increases have not
kept pace with the increase in housing costs. Consequently, the tax affects
more taxpayers than originally intended. Inheritance taxes were originally
intended to apply only to the super-wealthy. 2°4 However, largely because of
increased housing costs,20 5 a significant percentage of U.K. citizens may
ultimately be obligated to pay some IT.
Byers' proposal to abolish the IHT is unlikely to go forward, despite
popular disapproval of the tax. However, Prime Minister Brown could likely
win over many voters by making substantial changes to the -IT, such as
shaping the tax to apply only to the wealthy few, as originally intended.
The U.K. should create an exemption for a taxpayer's "qualified primary
residence" at the time of his or her death, while leaving secondary homes,
"' Press Release, supranote 134 (further noting that the inheritance tax was originally meant
to exempt from death duties a relatively modest family home and some accumulated lifetime
savings).
200 Poulter, supra note 198.
201 Id.
202

Id.

Id. (discussing a report by Scottish Widows stating that 41% of taxpayers would be
obligated to pay some IHT under the current exemption amount).
204 Byers, supra note 2.
20 Becky Barrow, 10 Million Families to Pay Death Tax, THIS Is MoNEY (U.K.),
203

Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/tax-advice/inheritance-tax/article.html?inarticle
id=416700&in_pageid=78 (commenting that the average price of a home in London has
passed the £285,000 exemption, and the average price of a home in the southern part of England
is quickly approaching the exemption amount); see also Raphael G. Satter, Tiny London
Apartment on Salefor $335K, A.P. FEATURES, Jan. 22, 2007 (reporting a seventy-seven square
foot apartment in the exclusive Knightsbridge neighborhood of London being sold for
$335,000), availableathttp://www.thefreelibrary.com/Tiny+London+apartment+on+sale+for+
%24335K-a01610671218.
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vacation homes, rental properties, and the like subject to taxation. "Qualified
primary residence" would be defined to include a taxpayer's single place of
principal residence. In order to be qualified, the taxpayer must own the
residence, and use it as his or her principal place of residence, for at least two
of the seven years prior to his or her death. Exceptions to the two-year
requirement would be provided for taxpayers who fail to meet it because of
events beyond their control, such as a change in place of employment, health
circumstances, or other unforeseen circumstances. The seven-year period,
during which a residence could become a taxpayer's qualified primary
residence, would mirror the seven-year period prior to death in which certain
gifts (such as PETs) are subjected to IHT taxation.2" 6 These time and use
restrictions, similar to those requirements in I.R.C. § 121,207 would function as
anti-avoidance mechanisms, curtailing potential abuse that might otherwise
result from an outright exemption of a taxpayer's primary residence.
Any proposal to drastically change the IHT should be able to provide a
substitute for the revenue lost. 20 8 While the exact effects of a qualified primary

residence exemption on IHT revenue are unknown, the rate structure of the
IHT should also be changed to offset the loss of revenue. Currently, a 40% tax
is levied on each dollar over the exemption amount, which is a rather steep
increment. 2 9 The U.K. should introduce an additional marginal rate, as well
as an additional marginal threshold amount. A 20% marginal tax rate that
would apply to the property in a decedent's estate valued in excess of a new
£200,000 would be an appropriate intermediate exemption threshold.
Furthermore, the current 40% rate on the value of an estate in excess of the
current threshold exemption of £285,000210 (which is scheduled to increase to

£325,000 for chargeable transfers made between April 6, 2009 and
April 5, 2010)211 should be retained. This proposed change to the IHT rate
206 TILEY, supra note 107, at 1224.
207

I.R.C. § 121 provides exclusion treatment on the sale of a taxpayer's personal residence

up to $250,000 for single taxpayers and $500,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly. I.R.C.
§ 12 1(b), (b)(l)(2)(A) (2000). In order to qualify for the exclusion, at the time of the sale, the
residence must have been owned and used by the taxpayer as the principal residence for at least
two years during the five-year period ending on the date of the sale. I.R.C. § 121(a) (2000).
20' Poulter, supranote 198 (noting that the £3.6 billion of estimated revenue to be generated
in 2006 by the IHT is equivalent to double the U.K.'s 2006 spending on counter-terrorism and
security).
209 Inheritance Tax Act, 1984, c. 51, sched. 1, amended by Finance Act, 2006, c.25, pt. 6,
§ 155 (Eng.).
2"0 Id.; see also HM Revenue & Customs, supra note 4.
211 Inheritance Tax Act, sched. 1.
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structure will likely offset,2 12 to some degree, the revenue lost by allowing an
exemption for a decedent's qualified primary residence. Moreover, the new
incremental rate structure will render the IHT more marginally progressive,
causing the wealthiest taxpayers to pay even more tax.
In addition to offsetting lost revenue and increasing marginal progressivity,
these proposed changes to the IHT would also provide for greater fairness and
administrative simplicity. The changes proposed above would promote the
IHT's original purpose of taxing only the wealthiest, while bringing relief to
many taxpayers, who have become exposed to tax liability due to inflation in
the housing market. Furthermore, the estates of many taxpayers whose
principal asset is their home would no longer be forced to sell that home to pay
the IHT. This proposal would save the executors of taxpayers' estates the
aggravation and cost of obtaining an appraisal on the home, thereby making the
estate valuation process simpler and less expensive.
Exempting the qualified primary residence from a taxpayer's estate
attempts to balance society's desire to promote a meritocracy with a person's
natural desire to provide for their loved ones. This proposal allows the IHT to
continue to tax all assets in a taxpayer's estate, other than his or her primary
home. Therefore, the IHT would continue to redistribute wealth and help
avoid one individual or family from accumulating an abundance of wealth and
power. In addition, by providing an exemption for a person's primary
residence, often the most valuable asset (both sentimentally and financially)
in a person's estate, the IHT would be less likely to reduce a taxpayer's
incentive to engage in productive activities since less of his or her earnings
will go the government and more will go to those chosen by the taxpayer.
Proponents of the current IHT may note that very few taxpayers ever pay
'
Some
IHT---only "37,000 estates paid it last year out of 600,000 deaths."213
would argue that the tax now affects only the very wealthy and will continue
to affect only the most wealthy because of the future increases in the
exemption amount that have already been enacted. However, were the U.K.
to enact this Note's proposal of exempting taxpayers' qualified personal
residence, the IHT would no longer affect those middle-income taxpayers
whose estates would not exceed the threshold were it not for the value of their
homes. This sort of exemption would better serve the IHT's original intent to
tax the wealthy. Furthermore, the proposed intermediate marginal IHT bracket

212 It is currently unclear to what extent such a change in the IHT would affect the revenue

generated by the tax.
23 Toynbee, supra note 128.

2008]

A COMPARATIVE GUIDE OF WHERE TO DIE

would not only help offset the lost revenue, but would also provide greater
progressivity to the IHT.
IV. CONCLUSION

Throughout the twentieth century, wealth inequality receded in England,
but increased in the U.S. 21 4 A hundred years ago, the United States appeared
to be the land of opportunity, whereas Europe seemed dominated by "an
entrenched upper class [that] controlled the bulk of the wealth."2'15 However,
since the late 1980s, the situation appears to have completely reversed, as the
26
United States has a much higher concentration of wealth than Europe. ,
Today, Europe appears to be the land of equality. 217 Because of the high
concentrations of wealth in the United States, an estate tax effectively
redistributes the wealth from few to many.21 8 On the other hand, the U.K. is
representative of Europe in that much of its wealth is owned by the middle
class. 2 19 Consequently, the JHT, as currently applied, is affecting many
middle-class taxpayers who the tax never intended to reach.220
This Note proposes an amendment to the IHT, providing an exemption for
a decedent's qualified primary residence and including an additional lower
marginal tax bracket to help offset the lost revenue. The drafters of the
original estate duty "never intended [for] it to apply [to anyone other than] the
landed gentry or the very wealthy., 22' Moreover, the inheritance tax initially
was designed to exempt from death duties a relatively modest family home and
some accumulated lifetime savings. This proposal implements the original
intention of the creators of the IHT, adapting those intentions to the modem
circumstances in the U.K.-such as the strong middle-class and the recent
housing price inflation-that threaten to bring millions of taxpayers within the
scope of the IHT.

215

Hauser, supra note 31, at 388.
Id.

216

Id.

214

Id.
Darnell, supra note 9, at 685 (noting that the U.S. estate tax falls primarily on the
wealthiest 10/-2% of the public).
219 Steed, supra note 133 (noting that those "estates valued [below] £500,000 accounted
for 71% of all those paying IHT" during 2003 through 2004).
220 Byers, supra note 2.
221 Id.
222 Press Release, supra note 134.
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Abolishing the IHT altogether would eliminate a substantial amount 22of3
revenue that could otherwise help fund public programs and policies.
However, by leaving the IHT largely intact, this proposal allows for significant
revenue generation, yet also minimizes the harsh effects of double taxation.
In addition, taxpayers retain some personal autonomy and control over the
ultimate disposition of their home, but are less able to leave their children
'
"enough [money] to do nothing."224
The IHT could motivate a person to work
despite the receipt of inherited wealth, because the amount of the inheritance
is reduced by the tax.
Prime Minister Brown, and others who approve of the current application
of the IHT,note that the tax only affects very few taxpayers.225 However, as
prices in the housing market continue to escalate, more and more middle-class
taxpayers, to whom the tax was never intended to apply, will become subject
to IHT liability.226 The annual increases in the threshold exemption22 7 have not
kept up with inflation in the housing market and are insufficient to prevent
middle-class taxpayers from possible exposure to IHT liability; therefore, a
change should be made.

223

Poulter, supra note 198 (stating that the IHT was expected to generate £3.6 billion of

estimated revenue in 2006-2007); If I Should Die, Wills, Inheritance Tax, http://www.ifishould
die.co.uk/inheritance-tax-cS4.html (last visited June 3, 2008) (estimating that the IHT "raised
about £3.6 billion for the government" in 2006-2007).
224 Editorial, Warren Buffett's Fortune, WASH. POST, June 27, 2006, at A20 (discussing
Warren Buffett's philanthropic plans and his belief that the rich "should leave their kids enough
to do anything but not enough to do nothing").
225 Hennessy, supra note 6.
226 Housing Boom Raises Inheritance Tax Spectre, UKNETGUIDE, Sept. 26, 2005, http://
www.ukne tguide.co.uk/Finance/Article/Housing-boom-raises-inheritance-tax-spectre.htm.
227 See supra Part II.C of this Note, which details the annual increases in the IHT threshold
exemption for chargeable transfers made through April 5, 2010.

